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The US Marine Corps were to admit (Combined
Action Platoon - an alternative doctrine) that search and destroy
methods ultimately failed in Vietnam, and the emphasis should instead
have been on pacification - the "clear and hold"
concept that, had the PV strategy been properly implemented, may have
radically affected the war. The constant failure in the US to understand
that the struggle was as much (if not more) political than military
bears remarkable similarities to the Rhodesian war, which likewise
became a test of will, rather than of strength.
An
important part of any successful counter-insurgency campaign is the
conduct of the security forces. It is essential that a strict
observation of the rule of law be maintained; it is the responsibility
of senior officers and politicians to ensure that this is the case.
Strong leadership - both morally and practically - must be provided on
the ground, both by leading through example and making it clear that
those who refuse to follow this leadership will be punished. Any failure
to do this effectively gives carte blanche to those soldier and police
who consistently over-step the mark, and practise acts of repression and
brutality against a civilian population. Perhaps the Rhodesian forces
should have had a better awareness of another low-intensity conflict,
the ultimate French political defeat in Algeria, where the French
military effectively won the shooting war but were defeated at the
negotiating stage.
War chronology
Historical overview Rhodesian army Breakdown of Rhodesian armed forces and their guerrilla opponents Air Force
Auxiliaries BSAP
RAR RLI
Rhodesia Regiment SAS Selous Scouts
Internal
Affairs
ZANU/ZANLA ZAPU/ZIPRA
Fifth Brigade
South Africa
USA
Order of Battle
Glossary
Operations
External Operations
CCMF
FREE Rhodesian war downloads
BIBLIOGRAPHY - Rhodesian war books and
articles
External links
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