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SFA (Security Force Auxiliaries)
How to Africanise the war, yet keep the political situation stable, and
essentially unchanged? The
Rhodesians found a possible answer with the Security Force Auxiliaries
(SFA) - Pfumo Re Vanhu. The essential idea was that "turned
terrs" would be "persuaded" to come "on side",
through a combination of propaganda, intimidation and misrepresenting
their possible futures. With men like "Comrade Max" ("I
am the new DC in the area"), white Rhodesia was generally
horrified, whilst it seems that the vast majority of Africans saw them
as little more than collaborating stooges. The initial
intentions, of "turning" captured African guerrillas, were quickly
abandoned, due both to a shortage of captured men, but also, more importantly,
to the general unwillingness of those captured to become collaborators. In order
to keep numbers up, it would appear that, increasingly, Africans with no
military background were "recruited" and became quasi-regulars,
outside the standard Rhodesian command structure. Recent
accounts
have started to examine the impact Auxiliaries had on the
communities they were based in, but they have done this without the
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input of either the Auxiliaries
themselves or the white Rhodesians responsible for their
deployment. The SFA should be seen as possibly the greatest missed
opportunity in the war. Had sufficient numbers been raised to genuinely
slow, or even turn, the struggle, it can plausibly be argued that
Smith's African allies would have been
able to exert sufficient pressure to influence the elections in his
favour. Were they the test case that allowed the success of
Buthelezi’s Inkhata in South Africa prior to the first truly free
elections? The ‘sheer indigestible amount of information
Rhodesian Intelligence collected’ (Bhebe and Ranger (eds) Soldiers in
Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, op cit) and surprising lack of proper
military-political co-ordination can go some way to accounting for the
low priority.
While more detailed questions are raised - where did the funding come
from, why there was such bureaucratic confusion over their control –
the overall question of why they were such an embarrassing failure in
the field remains largely unaddressed.
The first few months of the SFA –
initial recruitment, training and deployment came without any
press coverage. The first published account of the SFA was claimed by David Martin, in the Observer
(UK) of 11 August 1978 (a few days before the Rhodesians |
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introduced them
to a shocked country with the unveiling of ‘Comrade Max’ on August
13); the ‘Comrade Max’ incident, when images of AK-47 toting “guerrillas”
were presented to a shocked Rhodesian public marks the beginning of
press interest in the Auxiliaries. ( See The Sunday Mail,
August 13 1978 - front page of newspaper reproduced in Salt,
Beryl, The Valiant Years (Galaxie
Press Salisbury 1978) The correspondent, Johan Meiring did his military
service in PSYAC. He would clearly have been privy to the decision to
promote awareness; presumably as a result of the public disquiet, he was
stripped of his accreditation.
Originally liaison between
the Rhodesian military and auxiliaries was through
Special Branch, later on many were to protect PVs under IntAf and the rest under
Special Forces. The results were generally poor, though they apparently fought well
in Urungwe TTL. From then on there are
regular accounts of their activities - in particular in the context of the two
elections, in 1979 and 1980. Sithole’s men, disaffected by ZANU-Sithole’s
poor showing, were dealt with wholesale; napalmed and machine gunned in their
hundreds by white units.
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ZANU-Sithole auxiliary mid 1979 |
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Why were
they only created in the later years of the war? The conditions that forced the
creation of the Auxiliaries in 1978 did not exist in the early years – from
1966 until the early 1970s – which were a different sort of war. The Rhodesian
commanders of 1972 could even be compared to the German generals sitting so
close to Moscow in October 1941; unable to foresee their technically
superior, but overstretched, under-resourced security forces no longer
able to contain an enemy able to overcome through sheer
force of numbers within a few years. In 1972 it appeared that the
Rhodesian Security Forces had the country under control, despite
worrying messages starting to come from Intelligence about the degree of
guerrilla penetration. It was only with the war’s
intensification following the Portuguese collapse
that the way the Rhodesians fought had to change; seeming military
success had obscured the need to reach an essentially political
settlement. In 1974 it seemed – even to more impartial observers -
that the war might yet be won by white Rhodesia, but the more vigorous
prosecution of the war was accompanied only fitfully by political
concessions. The Rhodesian Front had consolidated a political
hold over command echelons of the Security forces, which may have
delayed the official blessing
needed for the Auxiliaries to become an influential factor. The
interpretation of insurgency campaigns elsewhere seemed to be restricted
to an awareness only of their more applicable military aspects, rather
than an acknowledgement that without genuine political concession the
long term struggle had little chance of success.
Whether image, or political necessity, or longer term
military planning envisaging the near-permanent external deployment of regular
units, the decision was taken to reequip them, and training was altered to turn them
into more of a conventional light infantry force.
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Whilst Rhodesian success - or rather, general lack of it, during the bush war is
still debated, it seems likely that the greatest role played by the Auxiliaries
was to come after the 1980 elections, during Op 1980 op merger.
The so-called
‘African Askari’ had enlisted largely as a result of unemployment
rather than any political convictions. They were to play a critical role in
the ceasefire demobilisation, when the numbers and level of experience were reduced as a
result of regular soldiers defected to South Africa. These contingents of
former army members integrated with ZIPRA or ZANLA, did not suffer
from problems of faction fighting because of their apolitical
stance and tended to require only further efficiency training to
be successfully integrated. It is to the credit of the incoming
hierarchy that they recognised the potential of this
semi-professional category. They were utilised and were
instrumental in sustaining the |
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seriously threatened at the end of 1980 and the beginning of 1981 |
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